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The merger mania that has gripped both the United States and Europe over the past several years
1 is a clear
invitation to economic analysis especially in light of the work of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983).  In
the context of a standard Cournot model, their work shows that:  1) two-firm mergers are typically
unprofitable; and 2) the non-merging firms gain from a merger of two of their rivals.  Together, these results
offer a  powerful theoretical disincentive for merger activity.
2  Such theoretical results make it particularly
difficult to understand the large premia that are paid by the acquisition firms in most mergers.  Yet such
premia clearly exist.  Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarize thirteen studies as indicating purchase premia
sufficient to generate an average two-month return to target firm stockholders of 29.1 percent.  A similar
abnormal return to target firm shareowners of 26.1 percent is found by Loughran and Vijh (1997) based on a
sample of 516 mergers.  Indeed, such premia have been cited by some analysts as an important source of the
general surge in stock prices since 1995.
3 If mergers are unprofitable, why merge and why pay a hefty
premium for the right to do so?
Statistical evidence on the ultimate impact of mergers further complicates these puzzles.  Both the well-
known study of Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and the recent work of Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that
the returns to the merged entity are often disappointing.  Given the large premium paid to the target firm, it is
largely the acquiring firm that suffers from these later profit disappointments.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model that may help to reconcile some of these observed
facts of merger activity.  The basic premise is that the parties negotiating a merger acquire inside information
regarding the true market strength of the newly merged entity.  Because the purchase price paid may then
signal this information to onlooking rivals, the parties to the negotiation have some incentive to distort that
signal in a way that is meant to indicate strength whether this is truly the case or not.  In general, this process2
puts an upward bias on acquisition prices.  It can also lead to outcomes in which “unprofitable” mergers
occur.
The Model
Consider a two-firm merger.  The merger will create a new firm that is either strong, S, or weak, W, with
probability q and (1-q), respectively.  In the course of negotiations, the two parties to the merger learn which
of these outcomes is the case.  That is, both the buying firm and the target become fully informed regarding
the strength of the merger.  One may envision this occurring as the result of the sharing of individual cost and
production information that reveals to each the degree of complementarity between their separate firms.
Thus, for example, in the negotiations leading up to a merger of two telecommunications firms or two banks,
the two firms may discover the full extent for cost savings, or the true cost of launching a new,
telecommunications package or banking product.  Alternatively, the two firms may learn demand
characteristics, say by sharing customer lists, that again enable them to determine just how valuable the
merger really is.  The crucial assumption is that while both merging firms know the merger’s true strength,
rival firms do not.  This is private information not explicitly available to the non-merger parties.
Following the merger, a rival to the new merged firm can take one of two actions.  It can either attack, A, or
retreat, R.  These actions might be thought of as entering or not entering in the case where the new merged
firm produces a product for a new market.  However, they could mean the expansion or contraction of
capacity in a different context.  Rather than restrict the set of actions to a specific subset, I have chosen the A
and R designations as a means to capture a wider range of possible environments in which the merger occurs.
If the new firm is strong (S), the surplus generated by the merger, in the absence of any aggressive behavior
by rivals (i.e., so long as rivals play R), will be large and in present value terms equal to V.  Of course, rivals
may not be so obliging.  Instead, they may attack the new firm.  If it occurs, such an attack will impose costs
on the newly merged firm—costs for which the present value is X when the merger is a strong one.  Hence, a
merger that creates a strong new firm generates a surplus value that is equal to either V or V-X, depending on
whether or not rivals attack or retreat in the post-merger era.3
If the new firm is a weak one (W), the surplus generated by the merger is v < V.  Again, though, this surplus
is only what occurs if rivals retreat in the face of the new firm.  If they attack, rivals inflict costs (in present
value terms) on the new firm equal to kX, where k > 1.  In other words, a weak firm suffers more when
attacked than does a strong one.  Thus, a merger that creates a weak firm generates a surplus of either v or v –
kX, again depending on the actions of rivals in the post-merger era.
Similarly, the outcome for rivals also depends on the underlying strength of the merger.  If the merger is
weak, an attacking rival enjoys a lump sum gain of G.  If the merger is strong, an attacking rival endures a
cost equal to  –F.  Rivals earn no gain and suffer no loss if they retreat.
In any merger an acquiring firm buys a target firm for some price premium, P, relative to the target’s firm
existing value in the financial markets.  In turn, the Nash bargaining solution implies that this premium be
such that the surplus generated by the merger is evenly split between the acquiring and the buying firm.
Here, we take this as a minimum offer that the buying firm can make.  That is, the target firm will not accept
a proposal unless the purchase premium is at least half of the surplus which, recall, is fully known by both
buyer and seller.  The buyer can however, if it wishes, make a more generous offer that transfers a greater
amount of the merger-generated surplus—perhaps even the entire surplus—to the target firm.  Upon
observing the price paid for the target firm, the rival(s) in the market decide either to attack or to retreat.
The extensive form of the game is shown in Figure 1.  Here, Nature moves first choosing the strength of the
merger.  At the next node, the buying firm negotiates with the target firm.  As a result of these negotiations,
both firms are fully informed regarding the strength of the merger.  The publicly announced deal that follows
includes a premium payment made by the buyer (B) to the target (T) that gives at least half of the surplus
generated by the merger to the target firm.  Thus, for a strong merger, the equilibrium premium must at least
be as high as (V – X)/2 or half the total surplus realized when rivals attack if the target firm is to accept the
offer.  It can be the higher amount of V/2, or half the surplus when rivals do not attack, or possibly even
greater.  Similarly, if the merger is weak, any deal that is accepted by the target firm must, in equilibrium,
include a premium of at least (v – kX)/2 or, again, half the surplus when rival attacks occur.4
Whatever premium is offered and accepted is observed by rival firms.  At that point, a rival has the option of
either attacking or retreating from the newly merged firm.  Clearly, a rival would like to know whether the
new entity is the strong or weak before it takes this action.  However, all it observes is the premium included
in the buyout bid.  The question then becomes whether and how this offer reveals the underlying strength of
the new corporation.
In a separating equilibrium, the premium paid by the acquiring firm differs according to whether the merger
creates a strong or weak firm.  As a result, a rival can infer the true strength of the merger from the
acquisition price.  If the premium indicates a strong merger, a rival’s best response is to retreat.  If it indicates
a weak merger, the rival will do best by attacking
PROPOSITION 1:  In a separating equilibrium, buyers in a strong merger pay the premium, V/2, while those
in a weak merger pay the premium, (v – kX)/2.  The necessary and sufficient conditions for such an
equilibrium are:
                   V  > 0                                                                                          (1)
and
                  v – V/2  <  (v – kX)/2                                                                   (2)
along with rivals’ beliefs that the premia, V/2 and (v-kX)/2, indicate with absolute certainty a strong and
weak merger, respectively.
PROOF:  Assuming that V is positive then, in a separating equilibrium, the buyer in a strong merger pays a
premium of V/2, while the buyer in a weak merger pays a premium of (v – kX)/2.  In each case, this reflects
an equal split of the surplus generated by the merger.  Neither party to a strong merger has any reason to
change its behavior since, by assumption, the target would reject a lower offer and the buyer gains nothing
from making a larger bid.  Nor does a rival have any reason to change its beliefs since these correctly
indicate the merit of attacking or retreating.  The only remaining issue is whether the parties to a weak
merger would wish to disguise their union as a strong one by paying the higher premium, V/2.  Inequality (2)
though rules this possibility out.  It indicates that the buyer gets less surplus from paying such an exorbitant5
premium than it does when it pays the lower premium and thereby reveals the nature of the merger.  Hence,
there is no incentive for the buyer in a weak merger to attempt to masquerade its purchase as a strong one.
Of course, if v – kX < 0, then weak mergers do not occur in the separating equilibrium
PROPOSITION 2:  In a pooling equilibrium, the premium paid by an acquiring firm is V/2 whether the
merger is a strong or weak one. The necessary and sufficient conditions for such a pooling equilibrium are:
                                                       v – V/2 > 0                                                                       (3)
                                                      v – V/2 > (v – kX)/2                                                          (4)
and
                                                    -qF + (1-q)G < 0                                                                 (5)
along with the beliefs by rivals that any premium less than V/2 indicates a weak merger with probability one.
PROOF: In a pooling equilibrium, no attack occurs.  Hence, the surplus generated by a strong merger is V.
In such a merger the buying firm will pay an equilibrium premium V/2.  It cannot pay less and there is no
reason to pay more since this does not increase its surplus but only transfers some of it to the target firm.  As
for rivals, condition (5) insures that, absent additional information beyond the probabilities assigned by
Nature, there is no incentive to attack.  Since the pooling equilibrium is, by definition, one in which no such
information is provided, rivals also have no incentive to change their behavior.
Again, the only issue remaining concerns the incentive of the parties to a weak merger to disguise their union
as a strong one.  Inequality (3) indicates that the surplus generated by the weak merger is sufficient that the
acquiring firm will still enjoy some gain even if it pays the greater premium, V/2.  Inequality (4) indicates
that this gain exceeds the surplus such a buyer will receive by paying the lower premium which, given rivals’
out-of-equilibrium beliefs, will surely lead to rival attacks.  Hence, the best response of the parties to a weak
merger is to negotiate a premium payment of V/2.  This amount is, in some sense, excessive from the
viewpoint of the buyer.  Yet any lower payment will reduce the acquiring firm’s net profit from the deal.
Two results follow immediately from the foregoing discussion.  First, in any pooling equilibrium, the
average premium is greater than or equal to what it would be in a full-information or separating equilibrium6
world.  In a full information or separating equilibrium world, the premium paid in the case of a strong merger
would be V/2, and the premium paid for a weak merger would be (v – kX)/2, so long as the latter term is
positive.  Thus, in a separating equilibrium, the average premium will either be qV/2 + (1 – q)(v –kX)/2, if
weak mergers are profitable or just V/2 if they are not.  In a pooling equilibrium, the average premium is
simply V/2.  Clearly, V/2 > qV/2 + (1 – q)(v –kX)/2 for any value of (v –kX)/2 > 0.
A second and perhaps even more interesting result is that, in a pooling equilibrium, “unprofitable” weak
mergers can occur in the sense that mergers are made for which the surplus is negative if rival attacks
happen.  Clearly, (v – kX)/2 can be negative.  Yet, as equation (3) indicates, a buyer in such a weak merger
may still earn some surplus by paying a large premium that successfully deters rival attacks.
In short, the pooling equilibrium may offer some partial reconciliation for the large volume of merger
activity and especially the large premia paid by acquiring firms with economic theory and statistical
evidence.  With pooling, average acquisition values are biased upwards, perhaps strongly so.  As a result, the
ultimate net gain realized by a typical buyer may be very small.  The latter effect will be more pronounced
when the merger is weak and, in particular, when its profitability rests on rival firms not attacking the newly
merged entity.   This may help to explain the quite low post-merger returns of acquiring firms documented
by Loughran and Vijh (1997).
The possibility that the acquiring firm in a weak merger may have to pay most or all of the surplus the
merger generates as a premium to the target shareholders raises the question as to whether there is any
mechanism by which the acquirer can avoid such sharing while still sending the desired signal to would-be
attackers.  One potential mechanism that suggests itself is for the buyer to pay for its purchase by issuing
stock in the new firm rather than by paying cash.  This does not change the official premium of V/2 paid for
the firm.  However, if the management and directors of the acquiring firm are also its major stockholders,
they may be able to reclaim some of the surplus lost in sending the signal of strength, by subsequently
claiming the perks and other benefits that lower the stream of profits to the new shareowner.  Indeed, an
explicit understanding may be reached in which just such a subsequent side-payment is orchestrated during7
the merger negotiations.  In this connection, it is interesting that the Loughran and Vijh (1997) also find that
the long-run returns to target firm shareholders are much lower when the purchase is paid for by stock in the
newly merged firm instead of by cash.  The implied exchange is an initial large premium to the target firm
stockholders which is subsequently returned to the buyer firm management through bonuses and other
perquisites which reduce the value of the stock used to pay that initial premium.
4
Summary and Conclusion
Corporate mergers have taken place at an incredibly rapid pace over the last several years in both the U.S.
and Europe.  Moreover, the price paid by acquiring firms always includes a substantial premium. These facts
stand in striking contrast with much of the theoretical and empirical literature on mergers.  That literature
suggests that many two-firm mergers should be, a priori, unprofitable.  It also suggests that, as a matter of
factual experience, many mergers have yielded disappointing returns to the acquiring firm.
The model presented here offers a partial reconciliation of these conflicts between the implications of
academic research and actual corporate behavior.  When the parties to a merger negotiation have inside
information regarding the true market strength of the newly created firm, rivals can only infer that
information imperfectly from the price paid by the acquiring firm.  Consequently, both parties to the merger
have an interest in manipulating that price so as to signal to rivals that the newly created firm is a strong one
before which rivals should retreat.  By so doing, the merging companies increase the surplus that the merger
generates.  If the requirements for a pooling equilibrium are met, this signal manipulation process leads to
many of the phenomenon observed in actual practice.  The merger premia paid by acquiring firms are, on
average, inflated relative to what they otherwise would be.  As a result, acquiring firms earn positive but
small returns from merging.  Indeed, the pooling equilibrium can even lead to the consummation of mergers
that would otherwise be unprofitable.  Paying for the merger with stock rather than with cash may offer some
possibility for the buyer to obtain a more equal share of the surplus generated by a weak merger in the
pooling equilibrium.8
Notes
1. L. Wayne, “Wave of Mergers is Recasting Face of Business in U.S.”  New York Times, January 19,
1998, p. 1; and C. Fleming, T. Kamm and R. Frank, “A Day of Mega-Mergers Wakes Up Europe,” The
Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1997, p. A16.
2. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show that some mergers can be profitable in the Cournot context when costs
are nonlinear.
3. See the New York Times article above for comments to the effect that merger buyout premia have been a
source of rising stock prices overall.
4.  Obviously, shareholders of the target firm can always sell the new stock upon receipt and thereby thwart
     this process.  If they all do this, however, the share price will fall quickly and the higher premium will be
     lost in any case.  The side-payment mechanism suggested here is meant to raise a possibility—not to
     provide a clear and perfect arrangement.
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